Themes in the Economics of Aging by Courtney Coile & Jonathan Gruber
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau
of Economic Research
Volume Title: Themes in the Economics of Aging
Volume Author/Editor: David A. Wise, editor
Volume Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Volume ISBN: 0-226-90284-6
Volume URL: http://www.nber.org/books/wise01-1
Publication Date: January 2001
Chapter Title: Social Security Incentives for Retirement
Chapter Author: Courtney Coile, Jonathan Gruber
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c10332
Chapter pages in book: (p. 311 - 354)Courtney Coile is assistant professor of economics at Wellesley College and a faculty re-
search fellow at the National Bureau of Economic Research. Jonathan Gruber is professor
of economics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a research associate and
director of the program on children at the National Bureau of Economic Research.
This work builds on earlier joint research with Peter Diamond, and we are grateful to him
for his continuing guidance throughout this project. We are also grateful to Dean Karlan for
excellent research assistance, and to the National Institute on Aging for ﬁnancial support.





Courtney Coile and Jonathan Gruber
One of the most striking labor force phenomena of the second half of the
twentieth century has been the rapid decline in the laborf orce participa-
tion rate of older men. In 1950, for example, 81 percent of sixty-two-year-
oldm en were in the labor force; by 1995, this ﬁgure had fallen to 51 per-
cent, although it has rebounded slightly in the past few years (Quinn 1999).
Declines have been seen for all groups of older men, as illustrated by ﬁgure
10.1. For women, these declines with age have been oﬀset bya no v e r a l l
rising trend in labor force participation, as shown in ﬁgure 10.2.1
Much has been written about the proximate causes of this important
trenda mong older men, and in particular about the role of the Social Se-
curity program. A large number of articles have documented pronounced
spikes in retirement at ages sixty-two and sixty-ﬁve, which correspond to
the early and normal retirement ages for Social Security, respectively.
While there are some other explanations for a spike at age sixty-ﬁve, such
as entitlement to health insurance under the Medicare program or round-
ing error in surveys, there is little reason to see a spike at sixty-two other
than the Social Security program. Indeed, as Burtless and Moﬃtt (1984)
document, this spike at age sixty-two emerged only after the early retire-










































































































































































































.Thep r esence of these strong patterns in retirement data suggests that
Social Security is playing a critical role in determining retirement deci-
sions. But in order to model the impact of Social Security reform on retire-
ment behavior, it is critical to understand what this role is. The evidence
of spikes at age sixty-two, for example, is consistent with at least three al-
ternative hypotheses. The ﬁrst is that there is an actuarial unfairness built
into the system penalizing work past age sixty-two, so that there is a tax
eﬀect that leads workers to leave at that age. The second is that workers are
liquidityconstrained;theywouldliketoretirebeforeagesixty-two,butcan-
notbecause they are unable to borrow against their Social Security bene-
ﬁtsa nd have no other sources of retirement support. In this case, there
will be a large exit at age sixty-two as beneﬁts ﬁrst become available. The
third explanation is that workers are information constrained or myopic;
they either do not understand or do not appreciate the actuarial incentives
for additional work past age sixty-two, so they retire as soon as beneﬁts
become available.
Thee xisting evidence would appear to refute the ﬁrst explanation. Dia-
monda nd Gruber (1998) calculate for a typical individual the implicit tax
on continued work at each age from the Social Security system and ﬁnd
that there is actually a small subsidy to continued work at age sixty-two.
There is some supportive evidence for the second view; Kahn (1988) ﬁnds
ap ronounced spike in the retirement hazard at age sixty-two for those
with low wealth, but that the much larger spike is at age sixty-ﬁve for those
with higher wealth. There is little work on the third view, other than a
recent carefule xposition of the model by Diamond and Koszegi (1999).
This paper provides a more thorough investigation of the ﬁrst eﬀect, the
tax eﬀect, along four dimensions. First, we assess whether the tax rate
Diamond and Gruber compute using a synthetic individual with annual
earnings at the median of his cohort is similar to the tax rate of the real
median person. We might expect a diﬀerence, as the shape of the earnings
history is a signiﬁcant determinant of Social Security incentives through
the dropout-years provision, and this is not appropriately reﬂected with a
synthetic earnings history. Second, we assess the distribution of retirement
incentives across the population. Even if there is no signiﬁcant disincentive
for the typical worker, disincentives for a large subset of workers could still
be associated with a spike in the aggregate retirement data. Third, we as-
sess the importance of considering incentives for retirement in the next
year versus incentives for retirement over all possible years, drawing on the
insights of the option value model of Stock and Wise (1990a,b). Finally,
we incorporate the role of private pensions, an important determinant of
retirement for a large share of workers.
Our strategy is to apply the model of Diamond and Gruber to a set of
real individuals, the older persons surveyed by the Health and Retirement
Survey (HRS). This is a very rich survey with information on individual
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Social Security earnings histories, private pension plan details, and demo-
graphics. These data allow us to compute carefully the incentives for retire-
ment from Social Security and pensions, both for the median individual
and across the distribution.
Our paper proceeds as follows. We begin, in section 10.1, with back-
ground on the relevant institutional features of the Social Security system
and the previous literature in this area. In section 10.2 we describe our
data and empirical strategy. Section 10.3 presents ourb asic results for the
accrual of Social Security wealth with additional work and the associated
tax/subsidy relative to potential earnings, both on average and across the
distribution. Section 10.4 then highlights the fundamental weakness of
simple one-year accrual measures of this type: Many Social Security
wealth trajectories are nonmonotonic, suggesting that the appropriate
measure must look across all years to ﬁnd the optimal retirement date.
We then present calculations for what we label “peak value,” an incentive
measure that provides a middle ground between accrual and the utility-
based option value metric of Stock and Wise (1990a,b) by comparing re-
tirement wealth at the current retirement date to retirement wealth at its
global maximum. In this section, we also extend the results to incorporate
private pensions. Section 10.5 concludes by discussing the implications of
ourﬁ n dings and the directions for future research.
10.1 Background
10.1.1 Institutional Features of Social Security
The Social Security system is ﬁnanced by a payroll tax that is levied
equally on workers and ﬁrms. The total payroll tax paid by each party is
7.65 percentage points; 5.3 percentage points are devoted to the Old-Age
and Survivors Insurance (OASI) program, with 0.9 percentage points
funding the Disability Insurance (DI) system and 1.45 percentage points
funding Medicare’s Hospital Insurance (HI) program.2 The payroll tax
that funds OASI and DI is levied on earnings up to the taxable maximum,
$72,600 in 1999; the HI tax is uncapped.
Individuals qualify for an OASI pension by working for forty quarters
in covered employment, which now encompasses most sectors of the econ-
omy. Beneﬁts are determined in several steps. The ﬁrst step is computation
of the worker’s averaged indexed monthly earnings (AIME), which is one-
twelfth the average of the worker’s annual earnings in covered employ-
ment, indexed by a national wage index. A key feature of this process is
Social Security Incentives for Retirement 3153. In particular, although earnings through age ﬁfty-nine are converted to real dollars for
averaging, earnings after age sixty are treated nominally. There is a two-year lag in availabil-
ity of the wage index, calling for a base in the year in which the worker turns sixty in order
to compute beneﬁts for workers retiring at their sixty-second birthdays. Although it would
be possible to make adjustments as data become available, this is not done. This gap would
becomei mportant if we had large and varying inﬂation rates.
4. The reduction factor will be only ﬁve-twelfths of 1 percent for months beyond thirty-
six months before the NRA, which will become relevant once the delay in NRA becomes
eﬀective.
that additional higher earnings years can replace earlier lower earnings
years, since only the highest thirty-ﬁve years of earnings are used in the
calculation (the “dropout year” provision).3
Then ext step of the beneﬁts calculation is to convert the AIME into the
primary insurance amount (PIA). This is done by applying a three-piece
linear progressive schedule to an individual’s average earnings, whereby
ninety cents of the ﬁrst dollar of earnings is converted to beneﬁts, while
only ﬁfteen cents of the last dollar of earnings (up to the taxable maxi-
mum) is so converted. As a result, the rate at which Social Security re-
places past earnings (the replacement rate) falls with the level of lifetime
earnings. Although up to 85 percent of Social Security beneﬁts are subject
to tax for retirees with suﬃciently high incomes (couples with non-Social
Security income above $32,000 in 1999), all of earnings are taxed (includ-
ing the employee portion of the payroll tax), raising the eﬀective replace-
ment rate of the program.
The ﬁnal step is to adjust the PIA based on the age at which beneﬁts
are ﬁrst claimed. For workers commencing beneﬁt receipt at the normal
retirement age (NRA; currently sixty-ﬁve, but legislated to increase slowly
to ages ixty-seven), the monthly beneﬁt is the PIA. For workers claiming
before the NRA, beneﬁts are decreased by an actuarial reduction factor
of ﬁve-ninths of one percent per month; thus, a worker claiming on his
sixty-second birthday receives8 0p ercent of the PIA.4 Individuals can also
delay the receipt of beneﬁts beyond the NRA and receive a delayed retire-
ment credit (DRC). For workers reaching age sixty-ﬁve in 1999, an addi-
tional 5.5 percent is paid for each year of delay; this amount will steadily
increase until it reaches 8 percent per year in 2008.
While a worker may claim as early as age sixty-two, receipt of Social
Security beneﬁts is conditioned on the earnings test until the worker
reaches age seventy. A worker aged sixty-two to sixty-ﬁve may earn up to
$9,600 in 1999 without the loss of any beneﬁts; then beneﬁts are reduced
$1 for each $2 of earnings above this amount. For workers aged sixty-ﬁve
to sixty-nine, the earnings test ﬂoor is $15,500 and beneﬁts are reduced at
ar ateo f$ 1f or each $3 in earnings. Months of beneﬁts lost through the
earnings test are treated as delayed receipt, entitling the worker to a DRC
on the lost beneﬁts when he or she does claim beneﬁts. Despite this, the
earnings test appears to have a pronounced eﬀect on retirement decisions,
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6. Earlier work by Blinder, Gordon, and Wise (1980, 1981) and Burkhauser and Turner
(1981) calculates tax rates under the pre-1977 Social Security rules.
with evidence of extreme piling-up of the earnings distribution among el-
derly workers at the earnings test limit (Friedberg 1998).
One of the most important features of Social Security is that it also
provides beneﬁts to dependents of covered workers. Spouses of Social Se-
curity beneﬁciaries receive a dependent spouse beneﬁt equal to 50 percent
of the worker’s PIA, which is available once the worker has claimed bene-
ﬁtsa nd the spouse has reached age sixty-two; however, the spouse receives
only the larger of this and his or her own entitlement as a worker.5 Depen-
dent children are also each eligible for 50 percent of the PIA, but the total
family beneﬁt cannot exceed a maximum, which is roughly 175 percent of
the PIA. Surviving spouses receive 100 percent of the PIA, beginning at
ages ixty, although there is an actuarial reduction for claiming beneﬁts
before ages ixty-ﬁve or if the worker had an actuarial reduction. In prac-
tice, estimating a family’s total beneﬁts is complicated by the fact that both
spouses may qualify for Social Security beneﬁts as retired workers. Finally,
beneﬁt payments are adjusted for increases in the consumer price index
(CPI) after the worker has reached age sixty-two; thus, Social Security
provides a real annuity.
10.1.2 Previous Related Literature
There are two broad strands of the literature on Social Security that are
related to this paper. The ﬁrst strand attempts to document the labor force
disincentives inherent in Social Security, or implicit Social Security “tax
rates.” Feldstein and Samwick (1992) model the tax rates on the marginal
earningsdecisionforsimulatedworkersofdiﬀerentages,earnings,andmar-
ital status. They ﬁnd that there are signiﬁcant marginal tax rates on earn-
ings for higher-income workers and secondary earners, and for younger
workers as well.6
A subsequent paper by Diamond and Gruber (1998) focuses more di-
rectly on tax rates around the time of retirement. They build a simulation
model similar to that used here and compute Social Security tax rates for
simulated workers. As noted above, they ﬁnd that for the median worker,
there is little net incentive or disincentive for continued work at age sixty-
two, although there is a sizeable positive tax rate at age sixty-ﬁve and
beyond due to the unfair DRC still in place. They also ﬁnd that tax rates
areh i gher for single workers, because they do not beneﬁt from dependent
and survivors beneﬁts, and that tax rates are initially lower for low earners
(who beneﬁt from the redistributive nature of beneﬁts) but eventually
higher (since they are penalized more by actuarial unfairness after age
sixty-ﬁve).
Social Security Incentives for Retirement 3177. The data used are generally the Retirement History Survey (Boskin and Hurd 1978;
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Blau 1994), although some authors have relied on the National Longitudinal Survey of Older
Men (Diamond and Hausman 1984), and recent work uses the Survey of Consumer Finances
(Samwick 1998).
8. The earliest studies (Boskin and Hurd 1978; Fields and Mitchell 1984) used standard
linear or nonlinear regression techniques. Later research (Burtless 1986; Burtless and Moﬃtt
1984) used nonlinear budget constraint estimation to capture the richness of Social Security’s
eﬀects on the opportunity set. The most recent work (Diamond and Hausman 1984; Haus-
man and Wise 1985; Samwick 1998; Blau 1994) uses dynamic estimation of the retirement
transition.
While suggestive, both of these studies suﬀer from a key limitation: They
do notc onsider the incentives facing real individuals. This is important
because of the dropout year provision, which implies that the actual pat-
tern of earnings, and not just the level of average or ﬁnal earnings, matters
for beneﬁts determination. As we will show later, even for workers with
the same average and ﬁnal earnings, there is considerable heterogeneity in
Social Security tax rates. By considering a real sample of individuals, we
will be able to measure appropriately both the incentives for the median
workera nd the underlying heterogeneity in these incentives.
The secondl i terature is that on the retirement eﬀects of Social Security.
An umber of studies use aggregate information on the labor force behavior
of workers at diﬀerent ages, such as that documented in the introduction,
to infer the role that is played by Social Security. Hurd (1990) and Ruhm
(1995) emphasize the spike in the age pattern of retirement at age sixty-
two; as Hurd (1990) states, “there are no other institutional or economic
reasons for the peak” (597). Using precise quarterly data, Blau (1994) ﬁnds
that almost one-fourth of the men remaining in the labor force at their
sixty-ﬁfth birthdays retire within the next three months; this hazard rate is
more than 2.5 times as large as the rate in surrounding quarters. However,
Lumsdaine and Wise (1994) document that this penalty alone cannot ac-
count for this excess retirement at age sixty-ﬁve, nor can the incentives
embedded in private pension plans or the availability of retirement health
insurance through the Medicare program. This does not rule out a role for
Social Security; by setting up the focal point of a normal retirement age,
the program may be the causal factor in explaining this spike.
The main body of the retirement-incentives literature attempts to model
speciﬁcally the role that potential Social Security beneﬁts play in de-
termining retirement. The general strategy followed by this literature is to
use microdata sets with information on potential Social Security beneﬁt
determinants (earnings histories) or ex post beneﬁt levels to measure the
incentives to retire across individuals in the data.7 Then,r etirement models
aree stimated as a function of these incentive measures. While the exact
modeling technique diﬀers substantially across papers,8 the conclusions
drawn are fairly similar: Social Security has large eﬀects on retirement,
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of the 1968–73 period can explain all of the change in labor force participation in those years.
10. See Meyer (1989) for a careful discussion of this issue in the context of Unemployment
Insurance (UI).
11. At a minimum, one would want to include the level of lifetime earnings as a regressor,
but most studies include only earnings in a recent year (i.e., Boskin and Hurd 1978; Burtless
1986). In addition, even using a somewhat longer time frame for measuring the earnings
control (as do Diamond and Hausman 1984) does not solve the problem; one could imagine
that certain features of the lifetime pattern of earnings are correlated with both beneﬁt levels
and retirement decisions, such as the ratio of earnings around age sixty-two to earnings at
earlier ages (since individuals who have relatively high earnings at older ages may have better
labor market opportunities around the age of retirement and may therefore work longer).
but the eﬀects are small relative to the trends over time documented in
ﬁgures 10.1 and 10.2. For example, Burtless (1986) found that the 20 per-
cent beneﬁt rise of the 1969–72 period raised the probability of retirement
at sixty-two and sixty-ﬁve by about 2 percentage points. Over this period,
however, the labor force participation of older men fell by more than 6
percent, so that Social Security can explain only about one-third of the
change.9
This literature suﬀers from two important limitations. First, the key re-
gressor, Social Security beneﬁts, is a nonlinear function of past earnings,
and retirement propensities are clearly correlated with past earnings levels.
This problem is common to the social insurance literature in the United
States.10 Foro ther social insurance programs, however, there is often varia-
tion along dimensions arguably exogenous to individual tastes, such as
diﬀerent legislative regimes across locations or within locations over time,
that can be used to identify behavioral models. There is no comparable
variation in Social Security, which is a nationally homogeneous program.
Of course, this criticism does not necessarily imply that the estimates of
this cross-sectional literature are ﬂawed; as Hurd (1990) emphasizes, the
nonlinearities in the Social Security beneﬁts determination process are un-
likely to be correlated with retirement propensities. However, there has
been little serious eﬀort tod e c o m p o s ethe sources of variation in Social
Security beneﬁts in an eﬀortt oassess whether the determinants that drive
retirement behavior are plausibly excluded from a retirement equation.11
This criticism is levied most compellingly by Krueger and Pischke
(1992), who note that there is a unique “natural experiment” provided by
the end of double-indexing for the “notch generation” that retired in the
late 1970s and early 1980s. For this cohort, Social Security beneﬁts were
greatly reduced relative to what they would have expected based on the
experience of the early to mid-1970s. Yet, the dramatic fall in labor force
participation continued unabated in this era. This raises important ques-
tionsa bout the identiﬁcation of this cross-sectional literature.
Thes econdp roblem with this literature is that it generally focuses on
only oneo fthe two key Social Security beneﬁts variables, including Social
Security beneﬁts or wealth but ignoring the Social Security tax/subsidy
Social Security Incentives for Retirement 31912. Only earnings since 1950 are required to compute Social Security beneﬁts for our
sample’s age range; the beneﬁt rules specify that a shorter averaging period is used for per-
sonsb ornp rior to 1929.
rate documented above. In theory, as discussed above, both of these factors
play an important role in determining retirement behavior. Studies that
include the tax/subsidy rate ﬁnd it to have a signiﬁcant role in explaining
retirement(FieldsandMitchell1984;Samwick1998);indeed,eveninKrue-
gerand Pischke’s(1992) papertheaccrual rateis oftenright-signed andsig-
niﬁcant,even as the wealth eﬀecti sinsigniﬁcant. More recently, Stock and
Wise (1990a,b) note that the correct regressor for considering both Social
Security and pension incentives for retirement is not the year-to-year ac-
crual rate, but the return to working this year relative to retiring at some
future optimal date.
Our ﬁndings are relevant to addressing both of these shortcomings. To
the extent that we ﬁnd substantial variation in the retirement incentives
facing workers under the Social Security system, even after conditioning
on correlates of the retirement decision such as earnings, it suggests that
there are signiﬁcant nonlinearities in the determination of Social Security
incentives that can help identify retirement impacts. We will also compare
the retirement incentives over the subsequent year with those over all fu-
ture years, following the insights of Stock and Wise.
10.2 Data and Empirical Strategy
10.2.1 Data
Our data for this analysis comes from the Health and Retirement Study
(HRS), a survey of individuals aged ﬁfty-one to sixty-one in 1992 with
reinterviews every two years. The ﬁrst two waves of the survey (1992 and
1994) and preliminary data for the third and fourth waves (1996 and 1998)
area v ailable at this time. Spouses of respondents are also interviewed, so
the total age range covered by the survey is much wider.
Ak ey feature of the HRS is that it includes Social Security earnings
histories back to 1951 for most respondents. This provides two advantages
foro ur empirical work. First, it allows us appropriately to calculate beneﬁt
entitlements, which depend (through the dropout year provision) on the
entire history of earnings.12 Second, it allows us to construct a large sample
of person-year observations by using the earnings histories to compute
Social Security retirement incentives and labor force participation at each
age. We use all person-year observations on men aged ﬁfty-ﬁve to sixty-
nine for our analysis, subject to the exclusions detailed below.
Our sample is selected conditional on working, so that we examine the
incentives for retirement conditional on being in the labor force. Work is
320 Courtney Coile and Jonathan Gruber13. Individuals were required to sign a permission form in order for their Social Security
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acteristics.
14. We keep observations for which the wife’s Social Security earnings records are not
available, but we can ascertain from the self-reported labor force histories that the wife
worked less than half as many years as the husband.
deﬁned in one of two ways. For those person-years before 1992, when we
areu sing earnings histories, we deﬁne work as positive earnings in two
consecutive years; if earnings are positive this year but zero the next, we
consider the person to have retired this year. For person-years from 1992
onward,w hen we have the actual survey responses, we cannot use this
earnings-based deﬁnition, since we have earnings at two year intervals
only.F or this era, we use information on self-reported retirement status
and dates of retirement to construct annual retirement measures. Al-
though these are somewhat diﬀerent constructs, the retirement rates by
agea re similar across the two samples, so we combine them for precision
purposes. We also consider individuals before their ﬁrst retirement only;
if a person who is categorized as retired reenters the labor force, the later
observations are not used.
Our sample selection criteria are documented in table 10.1. There are
6,173 men who participate in one or more waves of the HRS. We exclude
121 men who were born before 1922 and thus are subject to diﬀerent Social
Security beneﬁt rules. We lose an additional 1,747 men due to a lack of
Social Security earnings history data.13 We lose 860 men who ceased work-
ing prior to age ﬁfty-ﬁve, and an additional 214 men due to a lack of
information on their wives’ Social Security earnings histories (necessary
due to the family structure of beneﬁts).14 The 3,231 remaining observa-
Table 10.1 Sample for Analysis
Number of Obs Obs Lost
Person- Person-
Category Obs Year Obs Obs Year Obs
Men in HRS aged 55–69, 1980–97 6,173 40,614 — —
Drop if born before 1922 6,052 39,658 121 956
Drop if missing earnings history 4,305 29,110 1,747 10,548
Drop if not working 3,445 20,059 860 9,051
Drop if missing spouse’s earnings history 3,231 18,903 214 1,156
Drop if reentered labor force 3,231 17,547 — 1,356
Note: Obs is the number of persons for which we have Health and Retirement Survey (HRS)
data. Person-Year Obs is the number of person-year observations for which we have data.
Each row in the ﬁrst two columns shows the number of observations after the exclusion
labeled in that row. Each row in the second two columns shows the number of observations
lost through the exclusion labeled in that row.
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tionsa re converted into 18,903 person-year observations by creating one
observation for each year from 1980 through 1997 in which the individual
is between the ages of ﬁfty-ﬁve and sixty-nine and working. Finally, we
lose 1,356 person-year observations where the individual is working after
ap revious retirement. The ﬁnal sample size is 17,547 person-year observa-
tions.
10.2.2 Empirical Strategy
Our goal is to measure the retirement incentives inherent in Social Secu-
rity and private pension systems. For the case of Social Security, we begin
with the calculation of an individual’s Social Security wealth. The basis
for this calculation is a simulation model that we have developed to com-
pute for any individual his or her Social Security entitlement for any age
of retirement. This is based on a careful modeling of Social Security bene-
ﬁts rules, and our simulation model has been cross-checked against the
Social Security Administration’s ANYPIA model for accuracy.
Then ext step in our simulation is to take these monthly beneﬁt entitle-
ments and compute an expected net present discounted value of Social
Security wealth. This requires projecting beneﬁts out until workers reach
age 120, and then taking a weighted sum that discounts future beneﬁts by
both the individual discount rate and the probability that the worker will
live to a given future age. Our methodology for doing so is described in
the appendix. For the worker himself, this is fairly straightforward; it is
simplyasum of future beneﬁts, discounted backward by time-preference
rates and mortality rates. For dependent and survivor beneﬁts it is more
complicated, since we must account for the joint likelihood of survival of
the worker and the dependent. In our base case, we use a real discount
rate of 3 percent. To adjust for mortality prospects, we use the sex/age-
speciﬁc U.S. lifetables from the 1995 OASDI Trustees Report (intermedi-
ate assumption case).15 All ﬁgures are discounted back to age ﬁfty-ﬁve by
both time preference rates and mortality risk.
For the output of the simulations, we calculate several diﬀerent con-
cepts. The ﬁrst is the level of Social Security wealth. The second is the ac-
crual, or the dollar change in Social Security wealth from the previous year.
We then compute the “after-tax accrual,” which subtracts from this dollar
change the payroll taxes paid by the worker and his employer (assuming
full tax incidence on wages). Finally, since it is natural to think about
these incentives relative to the returns from additional work, we also follow
Diamond and Gruber (1998) in calculating the implicit tax/subsidy rate
on additional work, which normalizes the negative of the accrual by the
322 Courtney Coile and Jonathan Gruberpotential wage for that year; a positive accrual implies a negative tax rate
and vice versa. Thus, if the tax rate is positive, it implies that the Social
Security system causes a disincentive to additional work through foregone
Social Security wealth. To measure the full tax wedge, we use the gross
wage in the denominator; under the assumption that the employer portion
of payroll taxes is reﬂected in wages, we increase reported wages by 6.2
percent.
For assessing the accrual rate and related concepts used later in the
paper, we must project the worker’s earnings over the next year (or all fu-
tureyears)ifhecontinuestowork.Weconsideredanumberofdiﬀerentpro-
jectionmethodologies, and found that the best predictive performance was
from a model that simply grew earnings from the last observation by 1
percent real growth per year, so this is the assumption we use for our simu-
lations.
For the purposes of the simulations below, we assume that workers claim
Social Security beneﬁts at the point of retirement, or when they become
eligible if they retire before the point of eligibility. In fact, this is not neces-
sarily true; retirement and claiming are two distinct events, and for certain
values of mortality prospects and discount rates it is optimal to delay
claiming until some time after retirement (due to the actuarial adjustment
of beneﬁts). Coile et al. (2001) investigate this issue in some detail, using
simulation analysis to document the gains to delaying claiming and show-
ing that a nontrivial share of individuals do delay claiming past age sixty-
two. In this case, our calculations will overstate any subsidies to continued
work, since part of this subsidy will come from delayed claiming that could
be obtained without delaying retirement.
Also, it is important to highlight that our work is focused on the impact
of Social Security on the labor force participation decision. A separate
and interesting issue is the impact of Social Security on the marginal labor
supply decision among those participating in the labor force, which was
the focus of the Feldstein and Samwick (1992) analysis. This is more com-
plicated for those around retirement age, since it involves incorporating
the role of the earnings test, which we avoid with our analysis of participa-
tion.T his, in turn, would involve modeling expectations about the earnings
test, since individuals appear not to understand that this is only a beneﬁts
delay instead of a beneﬁts cut. This is clearly a fruitful avenue for further
research.
10.3 Social Security Accruals and Tax/Subsidies
10.3.1 Median Worker
We begin by considering the incentives facing the median worker at
each age. These results are presented in table 10.2. Each row represents
Social Security Incentives for Retirement 32316. The SSW value is calculated from the data for age ﬁfty-ﬁve, and is then constrained to
follow the pattern of accruals from age ﬁfty-six onward. We do this because the actual me-
dian SSW at each age does not correspond to the accrual pattern. If we use the SSW of the
person with the median accrual, the pattern of SSW is nonsensical (with large shifts from
year to year), since that person is diﬀerent at every year. If we use the median SSW across
the sample in each year (picking the median SSW in our sample, and not the SSW of the
median accrual person), the SSW rises substantially over all years, due to sample selection.
Another alternative is to project retirement incentives up to age sixty-nine for the sample
working at age ﬁfty-ﬁve; doing so, we ﬁnd that the median SSW follows the same pattern as
accruals, and that the accrual and tax variables are very similar to what we report here.
the incentives facing a worker whose last year of work is labeled in the
ﬁrst column; that is, the “Age 55” row represents the incentives facing a
workerw ho decides to retire on his ﬁfty-sixth birthday.16 We show for each
age the Social Security wealth, the accrual, the after-tax accrual, and tax/
subsidy rate. In the ﬁnal column, we show the tax/subsidy rate from Dia-
monda nd Gruber (1999), for comparison; their results are for a married
male, which is appropriate since 90 percent of our sample is married.
We ﬁnd that the median Social Security wealth for workers who retire
on their ﬁfty-ﬁfth birthdays is $154,928. Social Security wealth grows
steadily through age sixty-ﬁve, then declines. This is shown most clearly
Table 10.2 Accrual and Tax Rate, Medians by Age
Diamond-
Beneﬁt After-Tax Tax/Subsidy Gruber
Age Obs SSW Accrual Accrual Rate Tax Rate
55 2,811 154,928 2,277 933 0.047 0.022
56 2,746 157,205 2,136 1,136 0.052 0.046
57 2,444 159,341 1,958 1,314 0.057 0.060
58 2,131 161,299 1,791 1,517 0.061 0.069
59 1,822 163,090 1,687 1,781 0.067 0.072
60 1,547 164,777 1,563 1,848 0.073 0.071
61 1,252 166,340 1,643 1,848 0.073 0.064
62 1,010 167,983 3,855 48 0.002 0.028
63 688 171,838 4,019 46 0.001 0.005
64 443 175,857 2,849 843 0.027 0.031
65 313 178,706 902 4,831 0.145 0.188
66 159 177,804 2,074 5,833 0.176 0.225
67 91 175,730 2,908 6,418 0.249 0.269
68 57 172,822 4,190 6,989 0.334 0.439
69 33 168,632 4,043 7,138 0.252 0.455
Notes: Each row reﬂects the incentives workers face for continued work that year (e.g., the
Age-55 row is the incentive to delay retirement until age 56). SSW is the net present dis-
counted value of Social Security wealth at the beginning of the year. Beneﬁt accrual is the
change in SSW that results from working that year. After-tax accrual is the beneﬁt accrual
net of Social Security taxes paid during the year. Tax rate is the negative of the after-tax
accrual divided by annual earnings. Diamond-Gruber tax rate replicates results from table 1
in Diamond and Gruber (1999).
324 Courtney Coile and Jonathan Gruberin the next column, which presents the beneﬁt accruals at each age. From
ages ﬁfty-ﬁve to sixty-one, these accruals are positive due to the dropout
year provision; the median worker is increasing his Social Security wealth
by replacing lower earnings years in his earnings average. These accruals
then get much larger between ages sixty-two and sixty-four, due to the
actuarial adjustment. That is, the fact that accruals are larger after age
sixty-two suggests that the actuarial adjustment is more than fair for the
median worker; the gain to delaying receipt outweighs the fact that bene-
ﬁtsa re receivedf or fewery ears. At age sixty-ﬁve and thereafter, however,
there are negative accruals for working additional years because the de-
layed retirement credit is not suﬃciently large to compensate workers
fairly.
Then ext column amends the beneﬁt accrual by incorporating the fact
that the worker and his employer must pay payroll taxes for additional
work. This reverses the signs on the accruals at ages ﬁfty-ﬁve to sixty-one,
whicha re now negative, as the small beneﬁt of AIME recomputation is
outweighed by paying 12.4 percent of wages in tax. However, at ages sixty-
two to sixty-four, the larger beneﬁt accruals approximately oﬀset the taxes
incurred through additional work, so that the after-tax accrual for the me-
dian person is near zero. The after-tax accrual then turns sharply negative
from age sixty-ﬁve onward.
Then ext column converts these after-tax accruals into tax/subsidy rates
by dividing by the gross wage. There are positive taxes on work from ages
ﬁfty-ﬁve to sixty-one, but these taxes are signiﬁcantly lower than the statu-
tory 12.4 percent payroll tax rate, due to the beneﬁt of additional earnings
through the dropout year provision. The tax rate is near zero for the me-
dian worker at ages sixty-two and sixty-three and is 2.7 percent at age
sixty-four. From age sixty-ﬁve onward, the tax rate is positive and very
large. By age sixty-eight, the tax rate exceeds 30 percent, it drops back
down again at age sixty-nine, but the samples at these ages in the HRS are
very small.
These results are very similar to those in Diamond and Gruber, in spite
of severali mportant diﬀerences in methodology. First, Diamond and
Gruber use a smooth age-earnings proﬁle, which underestimates the value
of the dropout year provision for people with real earnings trajectories
with more variance. Second, Diamond and Gruber take an individual aged
ﬁfty-ﬁve and simulate his incentives to work at each future age, while the
current calculations potentially incorporate some selection eﬀects by using
only those individuals still working at each age. The most notable diﬀer-
encesb etween the two sets of results are at age ﬁfty-ﬁve, where Diamond
and Gruber ﬁnd a subsidy to work (by construction, their individual re-
places a zero year of earnings with his ﬁfty-ﬁfth year of work), and at age
sixty-two, where Diamond and Gruber ﬁnd a subsidy of 2.8 percent and
we ﬁnd a zero tax rate. The bottom line is very similar, however: Small
Social Security Incentives for Retirement 325taxes on work up through age sixty-one, tax rates near zero at ages sixty-
two to sixty-four, and more sizeable taxes after age sixty-ﬁve. Thus, we
reaﬃrm the important conclusion of previous studies that the Social Secu-
rity system does not place a signiﬁcant tax on work at age sixty-two for
the median worker.
10.3.2 Heterogeneity
As emphasized earlier, the incentives facing the median worker may
mask considerable heterogeneity across the population in retirement in-
centives. Substantial heterogeneity may in turn be associated with an in-
crease in retirement rates at age sixty-two, even if the incentives are small
for the median worker. If, for example, there are large tax rates on work
for5 0p ercent of the population, then there may be a zero tax rate for the
median worker, but still potentially a large amount of retirement at age
sixty-two.
We explore the heterogeneity in incentives in table 10.3, which shows
the distribution of after-tax accruals and of tax/subsidy rates by age. As is
immediately apparent, there is a substantial amount of heterogeneity in
the accruals and tax rates. For example, from age ﬁfty-ﬁve to sixty-one,
while the median tax rate is positive and nontrivial, roughly one-sixth of
the sample actually has a subsidy to additional work. At age sixty-two,
while there is a zero tax rate for the median worker, 10 percent of the
sample faces a tax rate of 6.8 percent or higher, and the standard deviation
of the tax rate is 17.8 percent. After age sixty-ﬁve, while virtually all of the
sample faces positive tax rates, there remains substantial variation in the
magnitude of the tax rate; at age sixty-ﬁve, the standard deviation is nearly
twice as large as the median tax rate.
What explains this substantial heterogeneity in Social Security incen-
tives? This is an important question both for understanding how Social
Security incentives work and for considering the validity of empirical work
whichr elies on Social Security incentives to identify retirement behavior.
As highlighted by Krueger and Pischke’s (1992) criticism of the previous
literature, if the vast majority of the variation in these incentives comes
from factors such as wages or marital status, which are themselves likely
to be independently correlated with retirement decisions, we might worry
that incentive measures are capturing these other aspects of retirement
decisions. If, however, as suggested by Hurd’s (1990) rebuttal to this line
of criticism, there are signiﬁcant nonlinearities and interactions otherwise
(likely) uncorrelated with retirement that primarily identify the impact of
these incentive measures, one might feel more conﬁdent about retirement
estimates.
We next turn to regression modeling of Social Security accruals and tax/
subsidy rates to address this question. We consider in turn various poten-
tial determinants of the variation in incentives:






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Table 10.4 Variance Decomposition, Accrual, and Tax/Subsidy Rate
After-Tax Accrual Tax/Subsidy Rate
R2 of Cumulative R2 of Cumulative
Variable Variable R2 Variable R2
Age dummies 0.062 — 0.044 —
Earnings 0.087 0.155 0.000 0.045
Earnings quartic 0.092 0.158 0.000 0.045
AIME 0.156 0.230 0.012 0.059
AIME quartic 0.171 0.238 0.015 0.064
Earn * AIME quartic 0.198 0.266 0.039 0.081
Married, agediﬀ 0.002 0.270 0.001 0.082
Spouse earn * AIME∧4 0.169 0.280 0.033 0.110
Low earn year 0.074 0.284 0.010 0.110
Notes: The second and fourth columns of the table show the R2 from regressions of the after-
tax accrual or tax/subsidy rate on the variable in the ﬁrst column; the third and ﬁfth columns
show the cumulative R2 from including that variable and all previous variables in the regres-
sion.L ow earn year includes earning in lowest year and number of years with earnings below
current years. For a description of the incentive variables, see notes to table 10.2.
● Age. As shown earlier, there is important variation in tax rates with
age.
● Earnings in the last year of work. This is the denominator of the tax
rate, and will also enter through the dropout year provision. This may,
as a result, have both linear and nonlinear eﬀects, so we try both a
linear earnings term and an earnings quartic.
● AIME. Average lifetime earnings is the primary determinant of bene-
ﬁts. Once again, the eﬀects will be nonlinear, through the redistribu-
tive function that determines the PIA.
● Marital status and age diﬀerence with spouse. Marital status will be an
important determinant of tax rates through the dependent beneﬁts
structure. In addition, the larger the positive age diﬀerence between
spouses (a larger number of years by which the husband is older), the
larger the value of the dependent spouse and survivor beneﬁts.
● Earnings in lowest year. In combination with earnings in the last year,
earnings in the lowest year will determine the value of the dropout
year provision. We also include the number of years in the thirty-ﬁve-
year earnings history with earnings below current earnings.
Ther e sults of this exercise are shown in table 10.4. We ﬁnd that the ex-
planatory power on the accrual is much more substantial than on the tax/
subsidy rate, which is not surprising since the tax/subsidy rate introduces
additional variation simply by normalizing by the wage. Thus, we focus on
the accrual in our discussion.
Our overall conclusion is that, although these factors have some ability
328 Courtney Coile and Jonathan Gruberto explain accrual patterns, the overall explanatory power is small. Factors
clearly (potentially) correlated with tastes for retirement such as age, cur-
rent earnings, and lifetime earnings, even when the former is entered as a
series of dummies and the latter as ﬂexible cubic functions, explains less
than 25 percent of the variation in accruals. Even if we include a full set
of interactions of these cubic functions of earnings and AIME, we explain
only 27 percent of the variation. Adding marital status, age diﬀerence with
spouse, spouse’s earnings, and the low earnings year explains only another
2p ercent of variation. Thus there appears to be a substantial amount of
variation in the accrual that is not explained by factors that would plausi-
bly otherwise be correlated with retirement.
10.4 Peak Value Calculations
10.4.1 Motivation
Ther e sults thus far have focused on one-year accruals of Social Security
wealth and the associated tax/subsidy rates on an additional year of work.
As noted above, a key insight of Stock and Wise (1988) in the private
pension context is that one-year forward measures of this type may be
misleading if there are substantial incentives or disincentives for retire-
ment in future years. This was a natural concern in the context of private
pensions, which often have dramatic and explicit retirement incentives at
certain ages, such as the plan’s early and normal retirement ages. However,
is this an important issue in the context of Social Security?
In fact, the critical importance of considering the entire future path of
incentives is illustrated in ﬁgure 10.3. This ﬁgure shows the most common
patterns of after-tax Social Security wealth evolution (including payroll
taxes paid for additional work) across our sample. In each ﬁgure, we graph
forag roupo fworkers the pattern of Social Security wealth evolution over
all future years; this is done for the full cross-sectional sample, comparable
to table 10.2, in which each worker contributes an observation for up to
fourteen years. Each observation is then the pattern of Social Security
wealth from that year forward, based on that year’s characteristics. Under
each graph is a ﬁgure for the percentage of our full cross-sectional sample
that is in each case, and the cumulative share across the cases. For ex-
ample, as shown in Pattern 1, 1 percent of the sample has an Social Secu-
rity wealth that is everywhere increasing, while Pattern 3 shows that 14
percent of the sample has an Social Security wealth that ﬁrst rises, then
falls. In each case, the length of each segment is deﬁned by the median
starting and ending ages of the segment, and the slope of the segment is
determined by the median Social Security wealth at the beginning and end
of the segment.
As these graphs illustrate, substantial nonmonotonicities of the type
Social Security Incentives for Retirement 329Fig. 10.3 After-tax Social Security Wealth Patternsseen for private pensions also exist for Social Security. For 38 percent of
our sample, there is a local maximum that is not a global maximum. The
most common data pattern (Pattern 2), which applies to 48 percent of the
sample, is one in which after-tax Social Security wealth is always declining.
However, the second most common pattern (Pattern 6), which applies to
29 percent of the sample, is one in which after-tax Social Security wealth
declines from ﬁfty-ﬁve to sixty-one, rises from sixty-two to sixty-four,
then falls.
This is a striking ﬁnding, because it highlights an important weakness
of the accrual measure. For any given year from age ﬁfty-ﬁve to sixty-one,
a typical worker will be lose money on net through the Social Security
system by working. However, by working, that worker is also buying an
option on the more than fair actuarial adjustment that exists from age
sixty-two to sixty-four. Incorporating this option, as shown in Pattern 6,
leadst othe conclusion that there may overall be net subsidies to work
before ages ixty-two for many workers through the Social Security system.
10.4.2 Peak Value
To incorporate this feature into our incentive calculations, we move
away from the accrual and tax/subsidy rates to a more forward looking
measure of incentives, which we call “peak value.” This is the value of
continuing to work until the future year when Social Security wealth is
maximized, or the diﬀerence between the expected present discounted
value (PDV) of Social Security wealth at its highest possible value in the
future and the expected PDV of Social Security wealth if one retires this
year.T his is thus like the typical accrual concept, except that the individ-
ual looks forward to the optimal year, rather than only to next year. If the
individual is at an age beyond the Social Security wealth optimum, then
the peak value is the diﬀerence between retirement this year and next year,
whichi se xactly the accrual rate. Once again, it is natural to think about
this type of concept relative to potential earnings, but here what is relevant
is the entire stream of earnings until the optimal Social Security wealth is
reached. That is, if the optimum is $5,000 higher than Social Security
wealth today and is one year away, then this is a larger subsidy to continu-
ing to work than if the optimum were higher by the same amount but is
ﬁve yearsa way. We therefore normalize this peak value by the expected
PDV of wages over the period between this year and the year of maximal
Social Security wealth. Thus, this concept captures the beneﬁts of continu-
ing to work toward the peak Social Security wealth year, relative to earn-
ings over that period.
We show our peak value calculations in table 10.5. On a pretax basis,
peak value is $22,426 at age ﬁfty-ﬁve and falls steadily, becoming negative
at ages ixty-ﬁve. For the median worker, post-tax peak value is negative at
all ages except for ages sixty-two to sixty-three. However, 30–40 percent
of workers have positive after-tax peak values at ages ﬁfty-ﬁve to sixty-
Social Security Incentives for Retirement 331one. For these workers, the option value of a more than fair actuarial ad-
justment after age sixty-two outweighs payroll tax payments before age
sixty-two. As a result, Social Security is actually providing a subsidy to
additional work throughout all ages from ﬁfty-ﬁve to sixty-four. This sub-
sidy is rather small relative to earnings; the median after-tax peak value
for those with positive value is about $3,000. After age sixty-ﬁve, there is
a negative return to additional work for the vast majority of workers.
Thus, viewed from a year-to-year perspective, the Social Security sys-
tem taxes work between ages ﬁfty-ﬁve and sixty-one at a modest rate for
more than 80 percent of workers; but, viewed from a more forward-looking
perspective, there are actually modest subsidies at those ages for 30–40
percent of workers because workers are buying the option of delaying
claiming at a more than actuarially fair rate. Of course, this conclusion is
somewhat overstated, for two reasons. First, as noted above, exercising
the option to delay claiming does not require additional work, but simply
delayed claiming. Second, for an individual who was planning to retire
and claim at sixty-two for other reasons, there is no option value from
delayed claiming. Thus, whether peak value is the relevant concept for
actual retirement decisions at this age is an empirical question, and one
we plan to explore in further work. The fact remains, however, that this
option exists and is not recognized by the accrual concept.
It is worth noting an apparent inconsistency between table 10.2 and
Table 10.5 Peak Value, Medians by Age
Peak Peak Percent with
Value, Value, After-Tax
Age Obs SSW Pretax After-Tax PV  0
55 2,811 154,928 22,426 820 0.307
56 2,746 157,205 20,477 1,018 0.292
57 2,444 159,341 18,339 1,213 0.275
58 2,131 161,299 16,395 1,399 0.282
59 1,822 163,090 15,228 1,675 0.288
60 1,547 164,777 13,500 1,701 0.326
61 1,252 166,340 12,245 1,694 0.380
62 1,010 167,983 10,812 192 0.525
63 688 171,838 7,652 170 0.538
64 443 175,857 3,280 758 0.359
65 313 178,706 864 4,808 0.077
66 159 177,804 1,984 5,799 0.069
67 91 175,730 2,908 6,418 0.066
68 57 172,822 4,190 6,989 0.053
69 33 168,632 4,043 7,138 0.061
Notes: PV is peak value, which is the change in SSW (Social Security wealth) that results
from working until the age at which SSW is maximized (if peak has passed, PV is the after-
tax accrual). Peak Value, Pretax excludes Social Security payroll taxes; Peak Value, After-
Tax is net of taxes.
332 Courtney Coile and Jonathan Grubertable 10.5. As should be obvious, the peak value at any given age is just
the sum of all future accruals to the year when Social Security wealth is
maximized. Yet the sum of the beneﬁt accruals from age ﬁfty-ﬁve forward
in table 10.2 is not equal to the age-ﬁfty-ﬁve pretax peak value from table
10.5. The reason for this apparent inconsistency is simply composition
eﬀects; the median individuals at each age and across the two tables are
diﬀerent. There is no clear way to address this in the aggregate while still
representing the median values for our incentive variables of interest.
Instead, we illustrate that this is not a problem at the individual level in
table 10.6, where we show these concepts for a typical individual in our
data, who was ﬁfty-ﬁve years old in 1992 and who has roughly the median
earnings of his age cohort in our data. For this individual, the sum of the
beneﬁt accruals from any given age forward to the peak of Social Security
wealth (age sixty-six) does equal the pretax peak value at that age. That
is, at age ﬁfty-ﬁve, the peak value pretax is $19,170, which is the sum of
the pre-tax accruals from age ﬁfty-ﬁve through age sixty-six. Thus, for a
typical individual in our data, we see that there is no inconsistency across
these concepts; it arises only when we try to compare sample medians
across the concepts.
10.4.3 Heterogeneity
As with after-tax accruals, there is a substantial amount of heterogene-
ityi na f ter-tax peak values, as illustrated in table 10.7. At age sixty-two,
fore xample, the median after-tax peak value is $192. However, at that age,
Table 10.6 Accrual and Peak Value for Sample Observation
Beneﬁt After-Tax Tax/Subsidy Peak Value, Peak Value,
Age Accrual Accrual Rate Pretax After-Tax
55 2,120 1,388 0.046 19,170 1,388
56 2,093 1,218 0.041 17,050 1,218
57 2,029 1,159 0.039 14,957 1,159
58 1,730 1,360 0.046 12,928 1,360
59 1,018 1,996 0.066 11,198 1,996
60 674 2,287 0.074 10,180 2,287
61 781 2,077 0.066 9,505 2,077
62 2,863 110 0.003 8,725 274
63 2,817 164 0.005 5,862 164
64 1,747 804 0.025 3,045 804
65 999 1,451 0.045 1,297 1,451
66 298 2,052 0.063 298 2,052
67 368 2,621 0.080 368 2,621
68 960 3,116 0.094 960 3,116
69 1,480 3,540 0.112 1,480 3,540
Notes: Table shows the incentives for one sample observation. For a description of the incen-
tive variables, see notes to tables 10.2 and 10.5.
Social Security Incentives for Retirement 33317. Conversations with HRS staﬀ indicate the HRS did not attempt to collect pension
information for people in ﬁrms with fewer than 100 employees and that the nonresponse rate
among employers they did contact was about 30 percent.
48 percent of the sample has peak values that are less than zero, the 90th
percentile value is $6,299, and the standard deviation is $7,852, nearly
thirty times the median.
The variation in peak values is more readily explained by the other fac-
tors that might naturally be included in a retirement model, as is shown in
table 10.8. For the after-tax peak value, the inclusion of ﬂexible functions
of age, earnings, and AIME can explain about half of the variation; adding
marital status, spousal characteristics, and lowest earnings year can ex-
plain another 3 percent. Still, a substantial share of the variation in peak
value remains unexplained, suggesting that there is useful identifying vari-
ation available for inclusion in a retirement model.
10.4.4 Incorporating Private Pensions
We can also incorporate private pension incentives into our analysis.
The HRS collected detailed pension-determination information from em-
ployers for roughly 60 percent of the individuals with pensions in the
sample.17 They then used this information to create a pension beneﬁts cal-
culator that is comparable to the PIA simulation model we developed for
Social Security. We use these calculated pension beneﬁts at each retire-
Table 10.7 Heterogeneity in Peak Value
Peak Value, After-Tax
10th 90th Standard Percent
Age Percentile Percentile Deviation with PV  0
55 3,936 3,441 8,027 0.307
56 4,081 4,095 8,384 0.292
57 4,171 4,808 8,019 0.275
58 4,310 5,221 8,260 0.282
59 4,443 5,587 8,803 0.288
60 4,441 6,589 9,435 0.326
61 4,338 6,690 9,400 0.380
62 1,515 6,299 7,852 0.525
63 1,484 4,628 7,527 0.538
64 2,428 2,023 5,684 0.359
65 7,462 215 7,943 0.077
66 8,365 994 10,680 0.069
67 8,627 1,200 12,274 0.066
68 9,391 2,010 3,849 0.053
69 9,878 278 3,630 0.061
Notes: PV is peak value. For a description of the incentive variables, see notes to table 10.5.
334 Courtney Coile and Jonathan Gruberment age to create an analogous set of retirement incentive variables that
include pensions.
Ther e sults of doing this for both of our incentive concepts (accrual and
peak value) are presented in table 10.9. The patterns of incentives by age
for the median worker are very similar to those shown in tables 10.2 and
10.5. This should not be surprising because only 40 percent of the individ-
uals in our sample have pensions. Annual accruals are roughly $700 larger
Table 10.9 Peak Value Including Pensions, Medians by Age
Accrual Tax Peak Value, Peak Value,
Age Obs SSW After-Tax Rate Pretax After-Tax
55 2,811 183,138 342 0.019 28,417 326
56 2,746 185,767 381 0.018 25,843 197
57 2,444 188,380 540 0.032 23,120 61
58 2,131 190,675 649 0.040 20,524 18
59 1,822 192,781 857 0.047 18,757 90
60 1,547 194,637 956 0.051 16,518 329
61 1,252 196,384 1,003 0.053 14,341 1,143
62 1,010 198,149 672 0.030 11,431 1,857
63 688 202,891 662 0.025 7,949 863
64 443 208,312 381 0.014 3,382 172
65 313 212,733 4,237 0.145 774 4,179
66 159 211,980 5,384 0.189 1,984 5,369
67 91 210,024 6,201 0.246 3,538 6,137
68 57 207,164 6,916 0.344 4,330 6,916
69 33 203,236 7,138 0.278 4,452 7,138
Notes: Foradescription of the incentive variables, see notes to tables 10.2 and 10.5. These
results diﬀer through the inclusion of pension incentives as well as Social Security program
incentives.
Table 10.8 Variance Decomposition, Peak Value (full sample)
Peak Value, After-Tax
Variable R2 of Variable Cumulative R2
Age dummies 0.014 —
Earnings 0.024 0.040
Earnings quartic 0.025 0.041
AIME 0.254 0.318
AIME quartic 0.297 0.350
Earn * AIME quartic 0.473 0.491
Married, agediﬀ 0.006 0.497
Spouse earn * AIME∧4 0.162 0.518
Low earn year 0.100 0.521
Notes: See notes to table 10.4 for description of table layout. Low earn year includes earnings
in lowest year and number of years with earnings below current earnings. For a description
of the incentive variables, see notes to table 10.5.
Social Security Incentives for Retirement 335at ages ﬁfty-ﬁve to sixty-four when pensions are included. The median tax/
subsidy rate with pensions is roughly 2–3 percentage points lower at ages
ﬁfty-ﬁve to sixty-four than the median tax rate without pensions, and is
similar at ages sixty-ﬁve to sixty-nine. With the inclusion of pension, the
after-tax peak value is now often positive for the median person at ages
ﬁfty-ﬁve to sixty-four.
Table 10.10 shows the impact of including pensions on the distribution
of the incentive measures. There is a substantial increase in the variation
for all measures, particularly at ages ﬁfty-ﬁve to sixty-one. For example,
at ages ixty, the ratio of the standard deviation to the median is close to 1
for the tax rate in the no-pensions case, but is higher than 3 in the with-
pensions case. For the peak value measures, there are similarly large in-
creases in heterogeneity, particularly at younger ages. Thus, adding pen-
sionst othe analysis does not dramatically change the incentives at the
median, but does add substantial variation to the distribution of incen-
tives.
10.5 Conclusions
The substantial time series decline in older male labor-force participa-
tion,a sw ell as the striking correlation between the labor force departure
rates of older workers and the early and normal retirement ages for Social
Security, has motivated an enormous body of literature on how the Social
Security program aﬀects retirement. Yet there has been little recognition
of af undamental mystery in the relationship between Social Security in-
centivesa nd retirement behavior: There is no evidence of a substantial
disincentive to continued work at age sixty-two, despite the enormous in-
crease in labor force exit at that age. This point was highlighted by Dia-
monda nd Gruber (1998), but this was based on a typical (simulated) indi-
vidual.
In this paper, we have expanded on the earlier analysis in four ways.
First, we have considered the impact of Social Security retirement incen-
tivesi nr eald a ta, the HRS. We conﬁrm in these data that there is, in
fact, no tax on work at ages sixty-two to sixty-four at the median, further
heightening the disconnect between observed retirement patterns and the
pattern of Social Security retirement incentives. Second, however, we have
shown that there is a substantial amount of heterogeneity in these incen-
tives across our sample, and that (for example) there is a net tax on work
at ages ixty-two for about one-half of our sample. This would be more
consistent with a spike in the hazard rate at that age, if it is those individu-
als being taxed who are responding by retiring. We also show that factors
that otherwise might be expected naturally to impact retirement decisions
cane x plain only a small share of the variation in accruals, suggesting that
these are fruitful regressors for explaining retirement decisions.





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Third, we have suggested that the focus on next-year measures such as
accruals and tax/subsidy rates might be misleading, particularly at ages
ﬁfty-ﬁve to sixty-one, because they ignore the option value of reaching age
sixty-two and taking advantage of a (for many workers) more than fair
actuarial adjustment. Thus, we also have considered a peak-value concept
that compares wealth accruals not between this year and the next, but
instead between this year and the year in which Social Security wealth
reaches its peak. We ﬁnd that using peak values instead of accruals leads
to very similar results at the median after age sixty-two, but to subsidies
to workr a ther than to taxes at ages ﬁfty-ﬁve to sixty-one for a large share
of the sample. Finally, we incorporate private pensions into our analysis;
we ﬁnd that the addition of pensions increases the return to additional
workm odestly at the median and substantially increases heterogeneity in
the measures.
Our ﬁndings have two important implications for future empirical work
on Social Security and retirement. First, our results suggest that if re-
searchers are careful to condition on the determinants of both retirement
and Social Security incentive measures, there may be suﬃcientr e main-
ing variation to identify the impact of these measures on retirement de-
cisions. Second, our results suggest that, even in a Social Security-only
context, it is important to consider forward-looking measures of the type
pioneered by Stock and Wise (1990a,b). In preliminary work on retirement
decisions (Coile and Gruber 1999), we have found that these forward-
looking measures are indeed an important determinant of retirement be-
havior, while there is a much weaker relationship between retirement and
accruals.
Appendix
In this appendix, we provide the formula for the computation of Social
Security wealth.
Notation
t  year of observation
R  year of retirement
T  last year either spouse could be alive (maximum age is 120)
prh,s|t probability husband is alive at time s conditional on being alive at
time t
prw,s|t  probability wife is alive at time s conditional on being alive at
time t
d  real discount rate (.03 in base case)
age62h,s  indicator variable equal to 1 if husband is age sixty-two or over
at time s
338 Courtney Coile and Jonathan Gruberage62w,s  indicator variable equal to 1 if wife is age sixty-two or over at
time s
age60h,s  indicator variable equal to 1 if husband is age sixty or over at
time s
age60w,s  indicator variable equal to 1 ifw i f ei sa g es i x t yo ro v e ra tt i m es
rwbh,s  retired worker beneﬁt of husband if husband retires at time s
rwbw,62  retired worker beneﬁt of wife if wife retires at age sixty-two
dsbh,62dependentspousebeneﬁtofhusbandifwiferetiresatagesixty-two
dsbw,s  dependent spouse beneﬁt of wife if husband retires at time s
svbh,s  survivor beneﬁt of husband if wife dies at time s
svbw,s  survivor beneﬁt of wife if husband dies at time s
s, k  simple counting variables
Formula
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An important assumption built into the calculation is that the spouse re-
tiresa ta ge sixty-two.
The beneﬁt variables (rwb, dsb, and svb) are adjusted appropriately for
actuarial adjustment or delayed retirement credit. The adjustment depends
on R, the birth year of each spouse (since Social Security rules diﬀer by
birth cohort), and age diﬀerence between the spouses. Where an individual
ﬁrst claims retired worker beneﬁts and later tops them up to the level of
the dependent spouse beneﬁt, the appropriate actuarial adjustment is ap-
plied to each part of the total beneﬁt.
Social Security Incentives for Retirement 339Claiming is assumed to occur at ﬁrst eligibility (the age of retirement
or ages ixty-two, whichever is later). For simplicity, survivor beneﬁts are
assumed to be claimed no earlier than age sixty-two, though individuals
are allowed to claim them at age sixty, or earlier if there are dependent
children.
Thec alculations including pensions are analogous, except that pension
receipt commences as soon as the individual retires (not at age sixty-two).
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Comment Andrew A. Samwick
The Social Security program in the United States grew substantially in
coverage and generosity during the postwar period. Motivated by the
large, contemporaneous reductions in the labor force participation of older
workers, a substantial literature emerged during the 1970s and 1980s on
the eﬀects of Social Security on the timing of retirement. Surveys of the
literature can be found in Atkinson (1987) and Quinn, Burkhauser, and
Myers (1990). Most studies estimate statistically signiﬁcant relationships
between the level of Social Security beneﬁts and the likelihood of retire-
ment at various ages. However, these estimated relationships typically im-
Social Security Incentives for Retirement 341ply a small economic impact of altering Social Security beneﬁts on the
average age of retirement or probability of retirement.
This ﬁnding is rather surprising, and I believe that it is a consequence
of examining retirement primarily in a cross-section. I doubt that it has
convinced too many people that the diﬀerences in Social Security replace-
ment rates between cohorts who turned sixty-ﬁve in 1950 and those who
turned sixty-ﬁve in 1975 have nothing to do with the diﬀerences in the
cohorts’ respective retirement ages. The ﬁnding does tell us that, within a
given cohort, workers who are observed to have diﬀerent entitlements un-
der Social Security are not observed to retire at dramatically diﬀerent ages.
Even without time-series implications, this is an interesting result that is
worthy of continued study.
There are several possible explanations that can be explored as a re-
sponse to this ﬁnding. The ﬁrst is that investigators have made an inappro-
priate simplifying assumption regarding an important aspect of the retire-
ment decision. For example, Gustman and Steinmeier (2000) and Coile
(1999) have shown that retirement decisions of spouses should be modeled
jointly, rather than independently, as is done in most of the literature. An-
other simpliﬁcation is the separation of the household’s intertemporal con-
sumption problem from its retirement decisions. Although option value
models have made important advances toward incorporating intertem-
poral tradeoﬀsi nthe labor market, they typically assume uniformity in
the way households make those choices. Recent work on consumption has
shown that household consumption choices are characterized by higher
and more variable discount rates than are typically assumed in retirement
analyses. I will return to this issue at the end of my comments.
As econde x planation is that the primary determinant of cross-sectional
retirement patterns is some other phenomenon, such as the incentives from
employer-provided pensions. This is the motivation behind the original
Stock and Wise (1990a, b) option value model and the many subsequent
papers based on it. As documented in Kotlikoﬀ and Wise (1987), deﬁned
beneﬁt (DB) pension plans typically provide large ﬁnancial incentives to
delay or hasten retirement at various ages. These incentives vary substan-
tially across plans. Further, DB plans also grew in coverage and generosity
during the postwar period and, as shown in Luzadis and Mitchell (1991),
the ages at which retirement incentives are strongest has been falling over
time. The key ages for pensions are currently younger than the Social Secu-
rity early retirement age.
A third explanation is the one pursued by the authors in this chapter.
The thrust of their argument is that Social Security itself provides a variety
of diﬀerent incentives to workers with diﬀerent earnings histories. In order
to calculate these incentives, rich data on earnings histories are required.
The failure to ﬁnd an eﬀecto fSocial Security on retirement may in fact
be due to measurement problems. It would be tempting for a reader of the
342 Courtney Coile and Jonathan Gruber1. However, as discussed below, pension calculations are far more susceptible to measure-
ment error in the earnings histories.
option value literature to date to conclude that Social Security incentives
aren ot an important source of cross-sectional variation in retirement out-
comes in the United States. The authors have done the literature on the
incentive eﬀects of retirement programs a great service in carefully mea-
suring Social Security incentives. The main lesson the reader takes away
from this chapter is that rumors of Social Security’s irrelevance may have
been greatly exaggerated.
Beginning with the seminal work of Stock and Wise (1990a, b), studies
of the option value of retirement have utilized strong data on pensions
and weak data on Social Security. These studies have also found that in
comparison to incentives from pensions, Social Security incentives have
little explanatory power for retirement decisions. Samwick (1998b) ac-
knowledges the link between the poor quality of his Social Security data
and the imprecision of the estimates of retirement incentive eﬀects based
on them. Note that Social Security calculations place a greater demand
on the earnings data. Pension incentives depend only on the earnings his-
tory at the current employer and a forecast of future earnings with that
same employer.1 In addition to these earnings, Social Security incentives
depend on earnings in years prior to those spent with the current employer,
earnings at other jobs worked while with the current employer, and a fore-
cast of earnings that may be receiveda f ter the employee leaves the current
employer but before claiming beneﬁts.
Thep r esent chapter provides a basis for quantifying how important So-
cial Security retirement incentives are when measured with as much atten-
tion to detail as the pension incentives in past option value studies. It is a
tantalizing prelude to econometric analyses of retirement for male workers
in Coile and Gruber (1999) and working couples in Coile (1999). My com-
ments will therefore include some issues that are relevant to the authors’
broader research agenda. In the present chapter, the authors make two
arguments. The ﬁrst is that careful calculation and rich data yield substan-
tial heterogeneity in ﬁnancial incentives to retire from Social Security. The
second is that the authors’ measure of “peak value” is a comprehensive
and robust measure of incentives to hasten or delay retirement. My main
remarks will assess the validity of these points and make suggestions for
further research on the eﬀecto fﬁnancial incentives on retirement.
Heterogeneity in Social Security Retirement Incentives
TheH e alth and Retirement Study (HRS) is ideally suited to examining
the ﬁnancial incentives inherent in the Social Security system. The initial
HRS cross-section in 1992 is a nationallyr epresentative sample of house-
holds between the ages of ﬁfty-one and sixty-one. Subsequent interview
Social Security Incentives for Retirement 343wavesa re conducted every two years, and the authors have matched the
household data to Social Security earnings histories. This allows them to
calculate Social Security wealth at various ages and thereby estimate the
ﬁnancial incentives to retire at each age.
There are two characteristics of the data that must be demonstrated in
order to suggest that they will be useful for further analyses of retirement
behavior. The ﬁrst is the heterogeneity in incentives, controlling for age.
Ther esults are presented in tables 10.2 and 10.3 for the one-year accrual
of wealth and tables 10.5 and 10.7 for peak value. Median accruals are
positive before age sixty-two, large and positive from age sixty-two to age
sixty-four, and negative and declining at ages beyond sixty-ﬁve. Tables 10.3
and 10.7 suggest that there is variation in the magnitude of accruals by
agea round the medians, although I will argue below that this variation is
small compared to the variation in incentives caused by pensions. Tables
10.4 and 10.8 give an indication that much of this variation in accruals is
nots imply the result of diﬀerences in the factors (e.g., age, earnings, and
marital status) that help determine beneﬁts but might also aﬀect retire-
ment directly.
Thes econd characteristic is the nonmonotonic pattern of accruals as
workers approach retirement. These patterns are shown in ﬁgure 10.3 for
the authors’ measure of After-Tax Social Security wealth. The results here
are somewhat disappointing, in that nearly half, or 47.7 percent, have
monotonically decreasing Social Security wealth as given by Pattern 2.
Pattern 6 is the next most frequent pattern, with 29.0 percent of the
sample. This pattern diﬀers from Pattern 2 in that the negative accruals
arei n terrupted by an interval of positive accruals. These positive accruals
are fairly small and do not last very long, suggesting at least from the
ﬁgure that they are not too important in dollar terms. Taken together, these
two patterns—with little if any departure from a simple proﬁle of declin-
ing Social Security wealth—account for more than three-fourths of the
observations. As the authors note, in the absence of nonmonotonicities, it
becomes mored i ﬃcult to econometrically identify the eﬀects of Social
Security from other factors that may be increasing or decreasing with age.
It may be that the use of medians and piecewise-linear segments in ﬁg-
ure 10.3 masks some important diﬀerences within the patterns. For ex-
ample, there may be an important subset of workers who have very large
positive accruals between ages sixty-two and sixty-ﬁve, despite the low
median. It could also be that some of the workers in Pattern 2 look a lot
like those in Patterns 3 and 7, and that some look like Patterns 4 and 10
(with ﬂat segments instead of increases). The lack of variation indicated
in this descriptive work and the “success” of the initial econometric esti-
mations in Coile and Gruber (1999) and Coile (1999) present a bit of a
puzzle. More explanation is warranted if the latter estimates are to be
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thought of as identiﬁed by Social Security wealth rather than as other
factors that change monotonically for a given worker over time.
As a ﬁnal note about the Social Security wealth calculations, it is worth
emphasizing that the idea for calculating Social Security retirement incen-
tivesi sn ot original to this chapter. The real novelty in this chapter is the
data that are used, particularly the Social Security earnings histories. Be-
cause obtaining the earnings histories and working with them are not triv-
ial processes, the authors could do a useful service in this chapter if they
also calculated incentives using only the data on prior earnings available
in the public use ﬁles of the HRS. Comparisons of the pattern of incentives
with and without the earnings histories would help determine how useful
the extra data are. What will users of the HRS miss if they do not use the
detailed earnings histories?
Retirement Incentives from Pensions
Then ext interesting question to ask about the calculated Social Security
incentives concerns their magnitude—are these numbers large or small?
Since most of the recent research on the accrual of retirement wealth is
based on option value models of pensions, a natural benchmark is the dis-
tribution of pension incentives. The authors make use of the Pension Pro-
vider Survey (PPS) that accompanied the ﬁrst wave of the HRS. As imple-
mented, the PPS includes detailed pension information on roughly 60 per-
cent of the workers eligible for pensions.
The authors do not present analogous distributions of the incentives
from pensions in the HRS.2 However, they report distributions of peak
value including pensions in tables 10.9 and 10.10. The eﬀect of adding the
pension data is substantial. Comparing median peak (pretax) values in
tables 10.5 and 10.9, the inclusion of pensions adds about $6,000 at age
ﬁfty-ﬁve and $3,000 at age sixty. Tables 10.7 and 10.10 show that the most
dramatic eﬀects are (for this sample) at the higher retirement income levels.
The standard deviation of peak after-tax value at age ﬁfty-ﬁve increases
from $8,027 to $63,294 when pensions are included, and the 90th percen-
tile increases from $3,441 to $73,702. The inclusion of the pension data
has a smaller eﬀecta to lder ages, because most pensions have their early
retirement ages (and therefore largest incentives) between the ages of ﬁfty
and sixty. Very few workers who have pensions are still working past age
sixty-ﬁve.
To get an idea of the whole distribution of incentives, ﬁgure 10c.1 is a
graphical representation of incentives fromp ensions, taken from Samwick
(1998b). It shows the mean, 10th percentile, and 90th percentile of the
one-year beneﬁt accruals (see table 10.2, column 4) from the pensions in
Social Security Incentives for Retirement 3453. It is not uncommon for pension plans to provide multiple spikes in a worker’s accrual
of pension wealth. Workers who start working for their employers at older ages typically
have fewer and later (but larger) spikes in their accrual proﬁles.
the PPS that accompanied the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) 1983.
This distribution is for a worker with average earnings who started working
for his current employer at age thirty-one. That worker’s beneﬁts under all
pension plans in the sample are calculated and appropriately weighted to
reﬂect the distribution of workers in those plans. The vertical axis shows
the accrual as a share of current earnings. The graph shows that accruals
due to pensions are many times larger than those from Social Security.
The 90th percentiles at ages ﬁfty-ﬁve and sixty are roughly 1.4 and 1.0
times earnings in those years. Even the mean accruals are close to 60 per-
cent and 40 percent of current earnings at those ages.3
The main conclusion to be drawn from the pension results is that incen-
tivesf romp ensions will dwarf incentives from Social Security for workers
whoa re covered by both. This is the general result found in Stock and
Wise’s (1990a) sample of salesmen covered by the same pension. This re-
sult strongly suggests that researchers should examine workers with pen-
Fig. 10C.1 Pension accruals relative to wages, weighted average of all plans:
Hired at age 31, average wage
Source: Samwick (1998b, ﬁg. 2)
346 Courtney Coile and Jonathan Grubersions separately from those without pensions. It would also be interesting
to see how much the inclusion of pensions changes the optimal retirement
date in the peak value formula (discussed below).
Regarding the speciﬁc calculations with pensions in this chapter, I have
two primary concerns. The ﬁrst is that, when the distributions with pen-
sionsa re presented, only 60 percent of the pension-covered population is
represented. And considering the way that observations get lost in moving
from the HRS to the PPS, it seems clear that the subsample of pensions
that are found will be disproportionately those from the government sector
and large corporations. These employers typically are easier to locate, have
better record keeping, and account for multiple respondents to the survey.
This was certainly the case in the SCF 1983, which had about 70 percent
of the observations with pensions in its PPS, and the authors note (see n.
17) that the same is true here. Thus, the subsample of the pension-covered
population that is included in this PPS is more homogeneous than the
excluded subsample, which includes many fewer observations per plan and
hence more plans. Even the very large eﬀects of pensions on the distribu-
tion shown in tables 10.9 and 10.10 are likely underestimates of the true
contributions of pensions to heterogeneity in retirement incentives.
One possible remedy would be to control for this sample selection di-
rectly, perhaps by modeling it as a function of ﬁrm size, occupation, and
industry. This would essentially re-weight the sample to increase the repre-
sentation of the workers who are in the HRS and PPS with characteristics,
such as working at a small ﬁrm, that are associated with being omitted
from the PPS. In the absence of such a remedy, the variance decomposi-
tions of the sort presented in table 10.8 are likely to miss a lot of the varia-
tion in retirement incentives due to pensions.
My second concern is that pension calculations are extremely sensitive
to the quality of the inputs, particularly age, tenure, and the details of the
pension formulas themselves. The potential for coding errors is large, and
although the Survey Research Center staﬀ and other researchers have
worked diligently to make the formulas error free, pension calculations
must be checked for anomalous results in each application. It is a tedious
butn ecessary process. For example, suppose that, either because the re-
spondent reported a year of hire that was one year later than the actual
starting year or the pension formula was miscoded in the PPS to have
early retirement eligibility at an age one year too late. Consider a worker
whop aid a lot of attention to ﬁnancial incentives and therefore stayed
with the ﬁrm until the large spike in the accrual proﬁle at early retirement,
and then retired. We will observe this worker’s retiring just before a large
ﬁnancial incentive to delay retirement, because we have gotten the timing
of that accrual wrong by only one year. Note as well that the eﬀect ona
maximum likelihood estimation will be asymmetric—retiring one year
Social Security Incentives for Retirement 3474. Peak value also shares with the option value the potential drawback that it is not a full
dynamic programming model—it is calculated conditional on a given R*a nd considers only
the value of retiring in the best year. Lumsdaine, Stock, and Wise (1992) compare the option
value model to a dynamic programming model that compares the value of retirement in the
current year to the value of reevaluating all retirement possibilities next year. The distinction
is shown not to be important in their work.
after a large spike is not so diﬀerent from retiring at the spike, but retiring
oney earb efore the large spike strongly suggests that ﬁnancial incentives
do not aﬀect retirement.
The point is that fairly small errors in either the household or the pen-
sion survey can have potentially large eﬀects on econometric analyses. Be-
cause the present chapter seeks only to present a distribution of incentives
without estimating a behavioral eﬀect, the problem is less severe. Some of
the large accruals are probably oﬀ by ay earo rt wo in the calculations
underlying tables 10.9 and 10.10; however, these sorts of errors may in
large measure oﬀsete ach other, unless tenure or age is systematically over-
or underreported.
At this stage, I can only oﬀer suggestions to minimize the exposure to
these problems in subsequent work. An example is the way the authors
have backcast pension formulas to the years prior to the initial survey
(1992). Comparisons of pension formulas in the 1983 and 1989 SCF Pen-
sion Provider Surveys in Samwick (1993) and Gustman and Steinmeier
(1998) show that pension formulas changed substantially during the 1980s.
In particular, early retirement ages continued their downward trend, and
the growing inequality in wages was also reﬂected in growing inequality in
pension entitlements. Using the pension formula in 1992 to describe pen-
sion incentives during the 1980s is likely to expose the calculations to error.
It is quite unlikely that the historical provisions of the plans are accurately
represented in the summary plan description as of 1992. Fore xample, do
we see evidence of the temporary early retirement windows that were pop-
ular in the early 1980s and analyzed in Stock and Wise (1990b) in the
current formulas?
Peak Value versus Option Value
The authors begin to make the case in this chapter, and follow it up in
Coile and Gruber (1999), that their measure of peak value is a robust
measure of retirement incentives. Peak value is deﬁned as the maximum
increment to the actuarial present value of future retirement beneﬁts for
any possible year of retirement. Like the option value on which it is based,
it has the advantage of being forward-looking. It evaluates the ﬁnancial
gains to delaying retirement to the most advantageous year, not just the
next year as in a typical retirement wealth accrual variable.4 Peak value is
also easily scaled by the presentv alue of future wages until that date.
In fact, peak value is equivalent to the option value under a set of pa-
348 Courtney Coile and Jonathan Gruberrameter restrictions. To see this, consider the original derivation of the
option value from Stock and Wise (1990a). It begins with the indirect util-
ityf unction

















In this expression, R denotes the date of retirement and t denotes the cur-
rent date. The probability of living to year s conditional on being alive in
year t is (s|t). The discount factor is denoted by ,a n dr i s ka v ersion (or
intertemporal substitution) is measured by .T he ﬁnal parameter is k,
which represents the additional value of receiving income during retire-
ment rather than the working year. It is designed to capture the utility
value of leisure and is expected to be greater than unity. In evaluating
retirement possibilities, a worker would trade one dollar of income while
working for k dollars during retirement. Income takes the form of earn-
ings, ys, during the remaining years of work or retirement beneﬁts, Bs(R),
during retirement. Note that beneﬁts are a function of the year in which
retirement occurs.
Using this indirect utility function, the worker chooses the optimal date
of retirement, R*, as the one that maximizes Vt(R). The option value of
continued work is the excess of the indirect utility of retiring at R*r a ther
than the current date t.T he option value is Vt(R*)  Vt(t), or
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The ﬁrst two terms are Vt(R*), and the last term is Vt(t). When retirement
occurs at the current date, there are no terms reﬂecting the utility from
additional years of labor income.
By comparison, the authors’ peak value calculation is given by
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Peak value imposes three restrictions on the option value. The ﬁrst re-
striction is that the ﬁrst term in equation (2), pertaining to future earnings,
is dropped. This restriction should be innocuous. Variance decompositions
of the sort done in table 10.8 would show that earnings explain a larger
Social Security Incentives for Retirement 349fraction of option values than peak values, but this would not necessarily
suggest that one measure is preferred to the other in a regression. The
present value of earnings through the optimal retirement date can simply
be included in the regression in addition to the option value or the peak
value. For example, Samwick (1998b) ﬁnds that, controlling for the option
value of retirement, earnings do not have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on retirement
in most speciﬁcations. Additionally, this ﬁrst term (with the subsequent
two restrictions imposed) is the quantity that the authors use to scale peak
value in the right-most columns of tables 10.5 through 10.8.
The second restriction is that k is equal to unity. In an option value cal-
culation, this restriction implies that there is no disutility of working rela-
tive to being retired. In that context, such a restriction would be counterin-
tuitive and is not supported by the estimates of about 1.6 from Stock and
Wise (1990a, table 4). However, peak value compares income ﬂows only
during retirement, so this assumption is without loss of generality. Addi-
tionally, a value of k can be estimated in a simple regression as long as the
ﬁrst term from the option value calculation (the present value of future
earnings) is included as a regressor along with peak value. The value of k
would be the ratio of the coeﬃciento nthe peak value term to the coeﬃ-
ciento nthe earnings term.
The third restriction is that  is equal to unity. Setting 1i m plies
that workers are indiﬀerent to whether income and retirement beneﬁt pay-
ments vary across years. Values less than unity, such as the estimates of
approximately 0.75 in Stock and Wise (1990a), are consistent with individ-
uals who derive more utility from smooth income ﬂows than from variable
ones.I nthe option value calculation, the main variation in income across
periods pertains to the retirement replacement rate. Since the peak value
calculation pertains only to income received in retirement and both Social
Security and DB pensions typically pay annuities, the choice of  is much
lessc ritical in the peak value calculation. However, it would still be useful
to experiment with diﬀerent values of ,a pplied to both peak value and
the present value of earnings in a regression, in order to determine how
sensitive empirical estimates are to the smoothness of income over time.
Am ore subtle diﬀerence between the two concepts is that the optimal
retirement date, R*, may change when the present value of future earnings
is dropped from the option value to get peak value. Given the central role
of the optimal retirement date, the authors should investigate the extent to
which the two concepts yield diﬀerent values of R*. Doing so would re-
quire a more sophisticated procedure for forecasting future wages than
simply assuminga1p e r c e n tg r o w t hr a t e ,a sassumed here.
Parameter Selection and Heterogeneity
As discussed above, the main diﬀerence between the formulas for peak
value and option value is whether the ﬁrst term of the option value, repre-
350 Courtney Coile and Jonathan Grubersenting the present value of future earnings until the optimal retirement
date, is included in the calculation. Much of that diﬀerence can be elimi-
nated in practice by simply including that ﬁrst term as an additional ex-
planatory variable in a reduced-form speciﬁcation. Since future earnings
area na ppropriate variable in that regression anyway, the real issue with
using peak value rather than the option value is whether the values of the
parameters are estimated, as in Stock and Wise (1990a), or simply as-
sumed, as in reduced-form approaches in Samwick (1998b) or Coile and
Gruber (1999). This issue is relevant but perhaps not too important for the
risk aversion and leisure parameters,  and k.
Ther emaining parameter in both the option value and peak value calcu-
lations is the discount factor, ,i nthe formulas above. Mathematically,
1/(1 	 ), where 	 is the discount rate or rate of time preference.
The choice of discount rate is not a trivial matter in retirement analyses.
Berkovec and Stern (1991) report that in their dynamic programming
model, “the estimation algorithm would not converge” when they at-
tempted to estimate the discount factor. They ﬁxed it at 0.95. My own ef-
fortstoestimateoptionvaluemodelsinSamwick(1998b)weresimilarlyun-
successful, as it was not possible to obtain reliable estimates for both the
discount factor and the leisure parameter, k.A si nthis chapter, the value
of  was set to correspond to a discount rate of 3 percent per year. Stock
and Wise (1990a) estimate values for  of approximately 0.75 across sev-
eral speciﬁcations.
Part of the explanation for Stock and Wises’s estimate of such a high
discount rate (nearly 33 percent per year) is that it is discounting utility
rather than dollars. Another part of the explanation, however, is that dis-
count rates may in fact be very large. The best evidence for this comes
from wealth levels—even among households on the verge of retirement,
median ﬁnancial wealth corresponds to less than a year’s worth of income.
If discount rates were as low as 3 percent over the life cycle, then house-
hold wealth accumulation would be much larger than we observe for the
median household (by perhaps a factor of 4 or 5, based on simulations in
Samwick [1998a]). The median peak value of about $25,000 in table 10.5
would not be very large in comparison.
Other evidence on the magnitude of discount rates comes from the
cross-sectional variation in wealth. Rates of time-preference as low as 3
percent are inconsistent with the observed sensitivities of household
wealth to income uncertainty (Carroll and Samwick 1997) and to the re-
tirement replacement rate (Samwick 1995). In both cases, the observed
sensitivities are of the correct sign but are too low to be consistent with
patientc o nsumers. If households discounted the future at only 3 percent,
then they would react more strongly to diﬀerences in income uncertainty
and diﬀerences in the retirement replacement rate that imply very diﬀerent
possibilities for future resources.
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those levels.
Another characteristic of the distribution of wealth is its wide disper-
sion. Although many factors aﬀectw e alth accumulation, it seems hard to
believe that we could generate the observed distribution of wealth if all
households had the same 3 percent rate of time preference. Instead, we
should infer from the distribution of wealth that there are also distribu-
tionso fu n derlying preference parameters, such as the discount rate. In a
ﬁrst attempt to make such inference, Samwick (1998a) estimates using the
1992 SCF that the median discount rate (	)i s7.63 percent, compared to
an assumed interest rate of 4 percent. A household’s estimated discount
rate reﬂects the value that would be needed in a stochastic life-cycle model
of consumption to generate a predicted wealth-to-income ratio that
matches the household’s observed wealth-to-income ratio.
More importantly, although factors such as the retirement replacement
rate and income uncertainty are accounted for in the estimation, much of
the heterogeneity in wealth holdings appears as heterogeneity in discount
rates. The 25th and 75th percentiles of the distribution are 2.93 percent
and 14.66 percent, respectively. The diﬀerence in behavior for households
with these two discount rates is enormous. The full distribution is shown
in ﬁgure 10C.2.5 Samwick (1998a) also compares the estimated discount
rates across diﬀerent responses to a question regarding the household’s
Fig. 10C.2 Distribution of discount rates, survey of consumer ﬁnances 1992
Source: Samwick (1998a, ﬁg. 3)
352 Courtney Coile and Jonathan Grubermost important ﬁnancial planning horizon. Households who responded
“the next few months” had average discount rates of 10.43 percent, com-
paredt oa na verage of 5.91 percent for households who reported “ten
years or more.”
Evidence from wealth holding allows us to determine whether parame-
ters used in studying the ﬁnancial incentives to retire are reasonable. Al-
though a uniform discount rate of 3 percent is ﬁne for the descriptive,
univariate analyses in this chapter, more attention must be paid to the
choice of parameters in subsequent econometric models. The benchmark
should be a higher median value that is consistent with the median house-
hold’s low ﬁnancial wealth accumulation over the life cycle. The heteroge-
neity in discount rates, implied by the heterogeneity of wealth holdings,
should also be incorporated into the econometric speciﬁcation as a topic
forf urther research. This will necessitate a return to the structural estima-
tion of parameters in the option value, as in the original work of Stock
and Wise (1990a, b).
Conclusion
Overall, this chapter provides an interesting starting point for the grow-
ing literature that uses the rich data in the HRS to estimate the eﬀect of
ﬁnancial incentives on the timing of retirement. The main contribution is
to show that, when modeled with careful attention to detail, Social Secu-
rity itself yields both heterogeneity and, to a lesser extent, nonmonotonici-
ties in retirement incentives. These ﬁndings suggest a potentially larger
role for Social Security in explaining cross-sectional retirement patterns
than is currently believed.
The authors also make a strong case that, for the purpose of providing
descriptive statistics on forward-looking measures of incentives, peak
value is useful because it does not rely on parameters of an indirect utility
function. Most of that advantage will notb ep r esent in econometric analy-
ses, for two reasons.F irst, including the present value of earnings in the
regression accounts for most of the diﬀerence between calculations of peak
value and option value. Second, we actually do care about the parameters
that are chosen and about gaining a deeper understanding of the appro-
priate model for retirement decisions. Further improvements should en-
able researchers to estimate the role of pensions more precisely, and to
provide better links between retirement and saving behavior.
References
Atkinson, Anthony B. 1987. Income maintenance and social insurance. In Hand-
book of public economics, Vol. 2, ed. Alan J. Auerbach and Martin S. Feldstein.
New York: North-Holland.
Berkovec, James, and Steven Stern. 1991. Job exit behavior of older men. Econo-
metrica 59:189–210.
Social Security Incentives for Retirement 353Carroll, Christopher D., and Andrew A. Samwick. 1997. The nature of precaution-
aryw e alth. Journal of Monetary Economics 40:41–72.
Coile, Courtney. 1999. Social Security, pensions, and the retirement decisions of
couples. Manuscript, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, April.
Coile, Courtney, and Jonathan Gruber. 2000. Social Security and retirement.
NBER Working Paper no. W7830. Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research, August.
Gustman, Alan L., Olivia S. Mitchell, Andrew A. Samwick, and Thomas L.
Steinmeier. 1999. Pension and Social Security wealth in the health and retire-
ment study. In Wealth, work, and health: Innovations in measurement in the social
sciences, ed.R obert Willis and James Smith, 150–208. Ann Arbor: University
of Michigan Press.
———. 2000. Evaluating pension entitlements. In Forecasting retirement needs and
retirement wealth, ed.P .Brett Hammond, Olivia Mitchell, and Anna Rappaport,
309–26. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
Gustman, Alan L., and Thomas L. Steinmeier. 1998. Changing pensions in cross-
section and panel data: Analysis with employer provided plan descriptions. Na-
tional Tax Association Proceedings—1998, 371–77.
———. 2000. Retirement in dual-career families: A structural model. Journal of
Labor Economics 18:503–45.
Kotlikoﬀ, Laurence J., and David A. Wise. 1987. The incentive eﬀects of private
pension plans. In Issues in pension economics, ed. Zvi Bodie, John B. Shoven,
and David A. Wise, 283–339. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Lumsdaine, Robin L., and James H. Stock, and David A. Wise. 1992. Three mod-
els of retirement: Computational complexity versus predictive validity. In Topics
in the economics of aging, ed. David A. Wise, 19–57. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
Luzadis, Rebecca A., and Olivia S. Mitchell. 1991. Explaining pension dynamics.
Journal of Human Resources 26:679–703.
Quinn, Joseph, Richard Burkhauser, and Daniel Myers. 1990. Passing the torch:
The inﬂuence of economic incentives on work and retirement. Kalamazoo, Mich.:
W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
Samwick, Andrew A. 1993. The eﬀecto ftax reform act of 1986 on pension cover-
age: Evidence from pension provider surveys. Manuscript, National Bureau of
Economic Research, July.
———. 1995. The limited oﬀsetb etween pension wealth and other private wealth:
Implications of buﬀer-stock saving. Manuscript, Dartmouth College, December.
———. 1998a. Discount rate heterogeneity and Social Security reform. Journal of
Development Economics 57:177–46.
———. 1998b. New evidence on pensions, Social Security, and the timing of retire-
ment. Journal of Public Economics 70:207–36.
Stock, James H., and David A. Wise. 1990a. Pensions, the option value of work,
and retirement. Econometrica 58:1151–80.
———. 1990b. The pension inducement to retire: An option value analysis. In
Issues in the economics of aging, ed.D a vid A. Wise, 205–24. Chicago: University
of Chicago Press.
354 Courtney Coile and Jonathan Gruber